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Suppose a bidder proposes to purchase a target for less than its market value before the 
announcement. Should a target give such a bid any thought? On January 14, 2005, common 
stock of Computer Network Technology Corporation (CNT) traded at $6.62 (NASDAQ 
closing price). The following business day, McData Corporation announced its intention to 
acquire CNT in a stock swap offering 1.3 shares of its NASDAQ-listed Class A common stock 
for each share of CNT. Based on McData’s closing stock price of $4.25, the bid valued each 
CNT share at $5.525 (1.3 × $4.25) resulting in a negative premium of -16.5%. This is not a 
measurement error and is consistent with Thomson’s M&A tear sheet.1 Aside from the 
negative premium, the takeover was not unusual. McData sought to acquire 100% of CNT’s 
shares and had no toehold. CNT experienced losses, but was not bankrupt. The offer was 
supported by CNT’s management, approved by CNT’s shareholders, and completed on June 1, 
2005 under the terms of the initial bid without competing offers. 
Our US sample indicates that this is not an isolated case. On average, 8.4% of all 
mergers and acquisitions (M&As) exhibit negative premiums from 1995-2011, reaching a 
peak of 14.1% in 2004. While the average premium in the sample period is 43.2%, the average 
size of the negative premiums is 15.5%. Although there are several technical reasons for 
negative premiums, primarily related to measurement issues, we find that negative premiums 
still exist after correcting for, among others, adverse market movements, multiple deals, self-
dealing, legal or regulatory restrictions, reverse mergers, announcement date inaccuracies, and 
marginal deviations of premiums from zero. Our findings hold for a broad range of premium 
measures based on the very first announcement of a takeover offer including market return 
                                                        
1 Changing the reference point, such as four or eight weeks prior to the bid, still leads to a negative premium of 
-16.3% and -1.9%, respectively. The bid was also below CNT’s average share price in 2004 ($6.30) and in 2003 
($7.91). 
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corrections, different windows, and various premium thresholds below and above zero. For 
data quality reasons, we restrict our analyses to domestic U.S. mergers. However, in an 
exploratory extension, Table VIII indicates that negative premiums are a worldwide 
phenomenon. 
Earlier studies have acknowledged the existence of negative premiums (Dong, 
Hirshleifer, Richardson, and Teoh, 2006; Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz, 2004; Bates and 
Lemmon, 2003; Officer, 2003, 2007; Schwert, 1996). Yet no explanation has been offered. 
This paper provides theoretical and empirical evidence that negative premiums exist and can 
be explained rationally. Target shareholders need to be convinced that, ultimately, they will 
gain from the merger. Thus, a theory attempting to explain negative offer premiums must 
allow for positive post-merger premiums for target shareholders. We propose three 
explanations for negative premiums assuming rational, forward-looking shareholders whose 
decisions are based on new information revealed by the offer. 
The first explanation hinges on the fact that bidders pay with ownership when offering 
a consideration in stock. Target shareholders profit twice from merger synergies. First, they 
negotiate a share of synergies included in the offer premium through the share exchange ratio. 
Second, they participate in the bidder’s share of synergies that accrue to the merged entity 
through the target shareholders’ ownership in the joint entity. We designate the latter as 
“hidden earnouts” as they are hidden in the bidder’s negotiated share and conditional upon 
synergy realization after consummation of the merger. If the bidder offers less than the target’s 
market value, a favorable share exchange ratio could provide target shareholders with 
sufficient ownership such that hidden earnouts make the deal worthwhile. In fact, if the target 
is relatively large, a combination of negative premiums and hidden earnouts can be the only 
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option for the bidder to pay the target in stock without losing control over the merged entity. 
As hidden earnouts cannot be explicitly included in a bid, the market reaction to such an 
announcement should be positive. 
The second explanation refers to overvaluation as a target’s stand-alone market value 
could exceed a fair bid constituting a negative offer premium. Bidders could detect 
overvaluation while conducting valuations prior to the offer (Boone and Mulherin, 2007). The 
target management might accept a negative premium fearing that the overvaluation may soon 
be public knowledge. If the target is overvalued, the market should react to the announcement 
of a negative premium with negative abnormal returns, thus correcting the mispricing.2 The 
lower post-announcement share price then reflects the bid consisting of the target’s fair stand-
alone value plus a positive premium. As an alternative to overvaluation of a target’s 
fundamentals, pre-bid run-ups can constitute speculative overvaluation of anticipated merger 
gains to the target (Betton, Eckbo, Thompson, and Thorburn, 2014). Excessive run-ups may 
overshoot the announced offer resulting in a negative premium and a subsequent negative 
market reaction. 
The third explanation pertains to liquidity in the market for corporate control. 
Discounts in illiquid markets for corporate assets can severely depress M&A transaction prices 
(Schlingemann, Stulz, and Walkling, 2002). If targets are financially constrained or distressed, 
market illiquidity can push prices below fundamental values, as in fire sales (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1992). 
                                                        
2 CNT’s fiscal year ended 13 days after the announcement of McData’s offer. In the annual report, published 
prior to the consummation of the merger, CNT’s management warned that “we may not be able to achieve (...) 
profitability,” that “we may be significantly harmed if we do not complete the pending merger,” and that “we 
have significant indebtedness.” CNT shares fell $1 to $5.62 at the announcement. McData shares rose 11 cents to 
$4.36 and $5 at consummation. Thus, CNT’s offer premium and mark-up were negative. 
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Our empirical tests indicate that hidden earnouts explain negative premiums, 
particularly when bidders offer high equity portions for relatively large targets. As expected, 
the market reacts positively to negative premiums with sufficiently high hidden earnouts as 
target shareholders anticipate post-merger gains. We also find support for overvaluation, both 
of a target’s fundamental value and, notably, of anticipated merger gains (i.e., run-ups). As 
expected, the market reaction to these announcements is negative. The explanatory power of 
market liquidity is limited with weak support for M&A transaction volumes and financial 
constraints. 
This paper contributes to the growing literature on target premiums (Betton, Eckbo, 
and Thorburn, 2008; Eckbo, 2009). For the first time, we present theoretical and empirical 
evidence for negative premiums emerging from rational behavior. The broader implications of 
this finding go beyond negative premiums. In extensions of our analyses, we find that negative 
premiums are the tip of the iceberg of low positive premiums. Our theory and empirical results 
also hold for this much larger phenomenon. In fact, we find that our theory generalizes to the 
bottom 25% of all premiums. 
Our results have managerial implications for bidders as hidden earnouts can be used to 
negotiate lower offer prices. This particularly applies to bidders with strong long-term growth 
perspectives. Our theory also derives a direct measure for hidden earnouts, which can be 
estimated. Finally, for managers and shareholders of targets, we provide an answer to the 
opening question: should a target give a bid with a negative premium any thought? Yes, as 
hidden earnouts and corrections for overvaluation could make the deal worthwhile. 
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I. Theoretical Explanations 
A. Preliminaries 
To simplify matters, we make five assumptions. Table I summarizes the variables and 
definitions. 
 
A-1. Bidders acquire 100% of targets’ shares and do not have a toehold. 
A-2. Bidders and targets have one type of (common) stock. 
A-3. Bidders and targets know fundamental values prior to the bid. 
A-4. When the bid is announced, fundamental values are public knowledge. 
A-5. One initial bid without subsequent improvements or competing bids. 
 
Insert Table I about here. 
 
In line with (Betton et al., 2014, 2008), we compute premiums at the announcement of 
a takeover offer and refer to them either as offer premiums or simply premiums. 
 
𝑝 =
𝑏
𝑣𝑇
− 1  (1) 
 
b > 0 is the value of the initial public bid for a target at the announcement and vT > 0 is the 
target’s stand-alone market value prior to the bid. The bid, b, includes an equity component, 
8 
eb, and a cash component, (1 - e)b. X is the share exchange ratio, KB is the bidder’s share price, 
and NT is the number of target’s shares outstanding. 
 
𝑏 = 𝑒𝑏 + (1 − 𝑒)𝑏 = 𝑋𝐾𝐵𝑁𝑇 + (1 − 𝑒)𝑏  (2) 
 
After consummation, the share price of the merged entity, KM, reflects fundamental 
values (A-4), vf
B+vf
T, synergies, s, and the cash outflow, (1 - e)b, divided by the total number 
of post-merger stock outstanding.3 
 
𝐾𝑀 =
𝑣𝑓
𝐵+𝑣𝑓
𝑇+𝑠−(1−𝑒)𝑏
𝑁𝐵+𝑋𝑁𝑇
   (3) 
 
The post-merger value of the bid, bm, consists of the revalued equity portion and the 
unchanged cash component. The revalued equity portion refers to the share price, KM, and not 
the bidder’s pre-bid share price, KB. As the share exchange ratio, X, is fixed (A-5), it reflects 
the number of post-merger shares in the combined firm held by target shareholders per pre-
merger share.4 
 
𝑏𝑚 = 𝑋𝐾
𝑀𝑁𝑇 + (1 − 𝑒)𝑏   (4) 
 
                                                        
3 Whether the bidder finances the cash component through debt or cash holdings does not alter the argument. 
Excess cash has a market-to-book ratio of one. Increasing debt by one unit reduces the value of equity by one 
unit as the entity value does not change. Thus, the outflow of cash to target shareholders reduces the value of the 
merged entity. 
4 The fact that X is fixed does not exclude bid revisions or contractual devices (e.g., collars) (Officer, 2004, 
2006). Theoretically, each adjustment to a new X constitutes a new bid. Empirically, we control for collars and 
multiple bids. 
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Analogously to Equation (1), the premium after consummation, hereafter referred to as 
the post-merger premium, pm, can be defined using Equations (3), (4) and A-4. 
 
𝑝𝑚 =
𝑏𝑚
𝑣𝑓
𝑇 − 1  (5) 
 
To approve the deal, target shareholders must anticipate that they will eventually 
benefit (Participation Constraint). The post-merger premium must be strictly positive, pm > 0. 
Note that for post-merger events, we implicitly argue in expected terms. At or directly after the 
announcement, shareholders do not know the realization of pm, bm, or s, but they form rational 
expectations based on all currently available information. According to Equation (1), two 
approaches can explain negative premiums: 1) focusing on the initial bid and explaining why b 
< vf
T and 2) focusing on the target’s stand-alone valuation and explaining why vT > b. 
 
B. Hidden Earnouts (b < vfT) 
When the target’s stand-alone value is fair, a bid below the fundamental value results 
in a negative premium (b < vf
T = vT). A distinction must be made between stock swaps and 
other forms of payment. In stock swaps, the bidder partially transfers ownership and, in doing 
so, effectively pays more than announced in the offer. If the bid includes a portion, 1 − λ, of 
synergies, s, for the bidder, target shareholders receive two types of equity-based earnouts: 1) 
one that is announced in the exchange rate, X, of the bid, and 2) one that is hidden. The former 
is the target’s share of synergies, λs, in the offer premium, p. The latter, hereafter referred to as 
Hidden Earnouts πh, is part of the post-merger premium pm, which includes the target 
shareholders’ participation in the bidder’s share of joint synergies. Thus, the relationship 
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between the two premiums is pm = p+πh, effectively defining hidden earnouts as πh = pm - p. 
Lemma 1 presents the existence of hidden earnouts. The Web Appendix A contains all proofs. 
 
Lemma 1. Existence of Hidden Earnouts 
Hidden earnouts, defined as πh = pm − p, must exist if the bidder benefits from an 
acquisition (λ < 1) and the bid has an equity portion (e > 0). 
 
𝜆 > 0 ∧  𝑒 > 0 → 𝜋ℎ = 𝑝𝑚 − 𝑝 =
𝑒𝑏
𝑣𝑓
𝑇 (
𝑣𝑓
𝑇 + 𝑠 − 𝑏
𝑣𝑓
𝐵 + 𝑒𝑏
) > 0   
 
Lemma 1 indicates that hidden earnouts cannot be included in the offer premium 
explicitly. This is the crucial difference between equity-based and cash earnouts. The latter are 
future cash payments contingent upon some observable measure of performance. Cash 
earnouts have no hidden component and can be fully integrated into the offer premium, either 
with their maximum amount (e.g., SDC bid data) or their expected value. 
Hidden earnouts can be so large that a bid below fair market value (p < 0) still allows 
for substantial post-merger gains for target shareholders resulting in a positive post-merger 
premium (pm > 0). Proposition 1 determines a necessary and sufficient condition for negative 
premiums. 
 
Proposition 1. Hidden Earnouts and Negative Premiums: A negative offer 
premium (p < 0) results in a positive post-merger premium (pm > 0) if hidden 
earnouts are sufficiently high. Hidden earnouts are sufficient if and only if the 
following inequality holds. 
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𝑠
𝑣𝑓
𝐵 >
1
𝑒
(
−𝑝
1 + 𝑝
) , 𝑒 > 0 
 
Proposition 1 indicates that target shareholders accept a negative premium if synergies 
relative to the bidder’s fundamental value are sufficient. Increasing the equity portion (e) of 
the bid makes fulfilling this requirement easier, which we test empirically. 
The question remains as to why merger parties would entertain an offer with such a 
high portion of hidden earnouts that the offer premium turns negative. Even a very friendly 
target with a weak negotiation position should be able to trade off some hidden earnouts for a 
slim positive offer premium. However, the relative size of the target plays a crucial role. 
Imagine the extreme case where a target’s fair market value exceeds the bidder’s value. Here, 
the only available solution to pay with bidder shares without losing majority control is a 
negative premium, derived in Proposition 2. Empirically, we expect a positive relation 
between relative target size and the likelihood of negative premiums. 
 
Proposition 2. Control: If bidders need to finance an acquisition with an equity 
portion (e > 0) and want to control the merged entity (ξ < 0.5), a negative premium 
with sufficient hidden earnouts is the only possibility if the target is large. 
 
𝑒 > 0 ∧ 𝛿𝑇 = 0 ∧  𝜉 < 0.5 ∧ 𝑣𝑓
𝑇 >
𝑣𝑓
𝐵
𝑒
 → 𝑝 < 0 
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To develop Proposition 3 on the market reaction to negative premiums with hidden 
earnouts, recall that hidden earnouts cannot be included in the bid explicitly. 
 
Proposition 3. Market Response to Hidden Earnouts: Hidden earnouts (πh) 
cannot be reflected in the offer premium (p) based on Lemma 1. Thus, hidden 
earnouts trigger a positive announcement return of the target’s shares in the 
magnitude of hidden earnouts. 
 
C. Target Overvaluation (vT > b) 
If the target is overvalued, its stand-alone value exceeds the initial bid (vT = vf
T +δT > 
b) leading to a negative premium by Equation (1). The target shareholders accept a negative 
premium only if the post-merger premium is strictly positive (pm > 0) summarized in 
Proposition 4. 
 
Proposition 4. Overvaluation: If a target is overvalued so that vT = vf
T + δT > b, a 
negative offer premium (p < 0) results in a positive post-merger premium (pm > 0) 
if the following inequality holds. 
 
𝑏 = 𝜆𝑠 + 𝑣𝑓
𝑇 >
𝑣𝑓
𝐵𝑣𝑓
𝑇
𝑒𝑠 + 𝑣𝑓
𝐵 
 
A cash merger (e = 0) fulfills this inequality if s > 0 and λ > 0. An increase in the 
equity portion of the bid (e > 0) allows a lower initial bid that still fulfills the 
inequality due to hidden earnouts. 
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The question remains as to why the target management would accept the disclosure of 
the overvaluation with the announcement of a negative premium (A-4). One reason could be 
that the overvaluation will soon become public knowledge, as in the case of CNT (see the 
introduction). If this coincides with pre-announcement merger negotiations, the target’s 
management may prefer to announce a negative premium than an overvaluation that leads to 
an even lower (fair) stand-alone value. 
In addition to fundamental overvaluation, forecasting errors in pre-bid run-ups can 
produce speculative overvaluation. Run-ups can reflect takeover anticipation based on diverse 
information, such as other mergers in the same industry or rumors (Eckbo, 2009; Jarrell and 
Poulsen, 1989). According to this view, referred to as the substitution hypothesis, run-ups 
partially substitute the premium by anticipating some portion of the target’s synergies (Eckbo, 
2009; Jarrell and Poulsen, 1989).5 Recently, Betton et al. (2014) provided strong evidence in 
favor of the substitution hypothesis. Thus, even if run-ups do not fully substitute post-merger 
premiums, on average, the upper tail of the distribution may over-anticipate synergies causing 
negative premiums. 
 
Proposition 5. Run-ups: If run-ups substitute and overestimate the target’s share 
of future synergies so that E (λs) > λs, then a fair bid b = vfT +λs results in a negative 
premium p < 0. 
 
                                                        
5 Alternatively, the mark up hypothesis states that run-ups contain new information about the target’s 
fundamental value. According to this hypothesis, run-ups cannot lead to speculative overvaluation as an increase 
in the run-up forces the bidder to mark up the offer price accordingly (Schwert, 1996). 
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If a target is overvalued, either fundamentally in its stand-alone value or speculatively 
in expected merger gains, Propositions 4 and 5 indicate that a negative premium occurs. The 
market will correct this overvaluation irrespective of its cause with negative abnormal 
announcement returns as summarized in Proposition 6. 
 
Proposition 6. Market Response to Overvaluation and Run-ups: If a target’s 
fundamental value, vf
T, or its merger gains, λs, or both, are sufficiently 
overestimated such that δT > λs or E(λs) > λs, the target’s abnormal announcement 
return to negative premiums is negative. 
 
D. Liquidity 
In illiquid markets for corporate control, targets may have to offer a liquidity discount 
(Schlingemann et al., 2002). For negative premiums, liquidity discounts need to be substantial. 
This is the case when targets are forced to sell because they are financially distressed or face 
(imminent) bankruptcy, as in fire sales (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992). Several studies present 
evidence regarding fire sales with significant discounts (Pulvino, 1998; Todd, 1999; Ramey 
and Shapiro, 2001; Viral, Sreedhar, and Anand, 2007). 
Liquidity discounts can only explain negative premiums if the post-merger premium is 
strictly positive. Thus, even if target shareholders are forced to sell, they still must benefit 
when compared to all other options. Here two assumptions come into play. First, if the target 
is not taken over within a certain period, its value could be even lower. As such, merger talks 
are often initiated by distressed targets to avoid bankruptcy or pre-emptive liquidation (Eckbo 
and Thorburn, 2008; Thorburn, 2000). In addition, according to Q theory (Jovanovic and 
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Rousseau, 2002), assets are reallocated from low-Q sellers to high-Q buyers. If bidders can 
employ the same assets more efficiently, their bid should exceed the target’s stand-alone 
alternative. 
In our model, target shareholders anticipate a liquidation value of 0 ≤ vlT < vfT as the 
target’s ultimate value without a takeover.6 In a liquid market, a bidder is willing to pay b = vfT 
+ λs, but in an illiquid market, a liquidity discount l ∈ [0,1] can reduce the bid by more than 
the target’s gains (lb > λs) resulting in a negative premium p = (b - lb)/vfT − 1. The post-merger 
premium is strictly positive as target shareholders relate the discounted bid to an even lower 
liquidation value. 
 
Proposition 7. Liquidity: If liquidity discounts are sufficiently high (l > λs/b) and 
targets anticipate a non-takeover value that is sufficiently low (vl
T<b-lb), offer 
premiums p = (b - lb)/vf
T - 1 are negative, while post-merger premiums pm = b(1 - 
l)/vl
T are strictly positive. 
 
E. Agency Theory 
If the target’s managers privately benefit from selling the target below its fair value, 
agency theory suggests that they will do so. At the announcement, we would observe a 
negative offer premium. However, by design, the post-merger premium would be negative as 
well violating target shareholders’ participation constraints. Anticipating this, target managers 
will not support a merger below fair market value if the deal is motivated purely by self-
interest. This is different for positive premiums. Even if positive premiums are lower due to 
                                                        
6 For simplicity, we assume a liquidation value, but target shareholders can anticipate any future stand-alone value 
lower than vfT. 
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agency costs, shareholders will still benefit. If the post-merger premium with agency costs is 
positive, however, the offer premium is also positive. 
However, if we assume information asymmetry, it is possible that a manager 
communicates non-existent synergies to shareholders to close a deal with a negative premium 
if it is in the manager’s interest. Then, the post-merger value is positive in the eyes of the 
shareholders thereby fulfilling their participation constraints. It should be possible, however, 
to write a contract that prevents this. However, we cannot assume that this is always the case. 
Thus, in cases without such a contract, agency costs could potentially explain negative 
premiums. 
The empirical evidence on positive target premiums and agency costs is mixed and 
type dependent. While Bargeron, Schlingemann, Stulz, and Zutter (2009) find no relation with 
target CEO retention, Hartzell, Ofek, and Yermack (2004) report a negative correlation with 
cash payments for target CEOs and Moeller (2005) notes a negative and a positive relation 
with target shareholder control in the 1980s and 1990s, respectively. Recently, Luypaert and 
Van Caneghem (2017) analyze information asymmetry, which is a prerequisite for agency 
costs, in the context of M&As. They demonstrate, in a large scale study, that information 
asymmetry affects payment choices and acquisition gains. Yet, their main findings indicate 
that information asymmetry makes cash mergers more likely, and bidders benefit from opaque 
targets due to cash offers leaving future gains with bidders’ shareholders. This mechanism is 
fundamentally different from our theory as negative premiums are more likely in stock 
mergers. 
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II. Data and Variables 
A. Sample Design 
We included takeover offers announced from 1995-2011 recorded in Thomson Reuters 
SDC. The database provides the most reliable and accurate information on takeovers (Bollaert 
and Delanghe, 2015) with good coverage since the late 80’s (Barnes, Harp, and Oler, 2014).7 
Bids in the sample are subject to the following criteria.8 The deal value exceeds 10 million 
USD. Bidders had no toehold and made an offer for 100% of the target’s shares. Both 
companies were incorporated in the U.S. and had common shares covered by Datastream. The 
deal is not pending and was either completed or officially withdrawn until the end of 2015. To 
reduce the influence of regulation, we removed financial firms (SIC 6000-6999) and utilities 
(SIC 4900-4999). 
We use stock prices adjusted for dividends and stock splits as both can cause negative 
premiums. If a target receives several bids, only the first is considered to minimize 
confounding events. Here, we used SDC’s “original date announced,” which is the very first 
bid in a possible sequence and the most reliable date for premium measures (Mulherin and 
Simsir, 2015). All acquisitions with the same immediate or ultimate parent are eliminated 
(e.g., internal reorganization). We also exclude partial acquisitions, asset sales, and multiple 
acquisitions on the same day.9 Negative premiums are also common in reverse mergers that 
                                                        
7 We find that information on an acquirers’ announced offer price for a target share is most accurate since the early 
90’s, which is why the sample begins in 1995. 
8 For studies with similar criteria see, Betton et al. (2014), Dong et al. (2006), Helwege, Pirinsky, and Stulz (2007), 
and Schlingemann (2004). 
9 Parallel asset sales can hollow out a target. Also, if several subsidiaries are purchased together, tax reasons can 
make it worthwhile to negotiate negative premiums for some in combination with high premiums for others. 
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allow private companies to obtain listings without IPOs (Gleason, Rosenthal, and Wiggins, 
2005). For this reason and due to data availability, we remove private targets. We also ignore 
mandatory offers, where a bidder is required by law to make an offer for the remaining shares 
of the target, as they may be artificially low.10 Finally, we exclude spinoffs, recapitalizations, 
self-tenders, repurchases, deals with a state controlled entity, and deals with estimated 
announcement dates. 
After this procedure, we manually check stock prices, announcement dates, and SEC 
merger filings of all targets with negative premiums without uncovering any other technical, 
legal, or tax-related explanations. The final sample consists of 1,937 deals with offer 
premiums in SDC. Bidders and targets in SDC are matched with Datastream using SEDOLs 
and CUSIPs resulting in 1,776 deals after list-wise deletion. 
 
B. Premium Measures 
The offer premium refers to the officially announced offer price per outstanding target 
share, as reported in SDC, divided by a base price. We use the target’s share price four weeks 
(20 trading days, t = -20) prior to the announcement as the base price. This base price should 
be largely free of leakage of information and market anticipation of the pending offer. 
Selecting an earlier date would minimize the inclusion of run-ups, but would also open the 
window for confounding events. As the correct base price is unknown (Eckbo, 2009), Section 
IV reports robustness checks using base prices eight weeks (t = -40), one week (t = -5), and 
one day (t = -1) prior to the announcement. These windows are in line with recent studies (e.g., 
Betton et al., 2014 use t = -42). 
                                                        
10 In the U.S., there is no general mandatory bid requirement, except in a few states, if the bidder’s stake exceeds 
a certain threshold (20% in Pennsylvania, 25% in Maine, and 50% in South Dakota). 
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Following Krishnan, Hitt, and Park (2007), we adjust the base price with the change in 
the S&P 500 from the reference point (e.g., t = -20) to the announcement (t = 0). Market-
adjusted premiums control for negative premiums due to adverse market movements, where 
the valuation of the whole market, and not only of the target, drops. We also compute a 
premium measure without index correction. Empirically, the differences are negligible (see 
Section IV). Based on the four-week measure (t = -20), the number of negative premiums 
increases from 154 to 162 after adjusting for stock market movement. Except when stated 
otherwise, our models refer to the four-week premium (t = -20) adjusted for changes in the 
S&P 500. 
From the bidder’s perspective, the total consideration paid for the target is often higher 
than the equity price received by the target shareholders. Next to capital infusions and 
liabilities assumed, the total consideration also includes, among others, the purchase of 
options, assets, and warrants. However, we are interested in the perspective of ordinary target 
shareholders and why they accept negative premiums. Thus, we refrain from using the total 
consideration to prevent mixed perspectives in our analysis. 
 
C. Construction of Variables 
To test Proposition 1, we use the equity portion of the bid (EQ) from SDC and 
compute proxies for hidden earnouts. Hidden earnouts increase in synergies, which are 
unobserved. We use the bidders cumulated abnormal return around the announcement (CAR 
B) as one proxy, defined as the market adjusted CAR from t = -1 to t = 1 (Dong et al., 2006).11 
Other imperfect proxies for synergies include the target’s operational profitability (ROIC), 
                                                        
11 We compute CAR T analogously. 
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cost-income ratio (CI), and capital turnover (TURNOVER).12 More importantly, we also 
compute a direct measure of hidden earnouts (HE), which is based on the theoretical value 
derived in Lemma 1. In doing so, we replace unobserved fundamental values with post-
announcement market values at t = 5, which should reflect expected synergies and adjustments 
for mispricing. 
Section IV considers alternative windows to capture the market response measured by 
cumulated abnormal returns (CAR B and CAR T). Apparently, windows that are too short may 
limit the market in fully understanding and compounding expected synergies into the price. 
Yet, extending the window reduces the sample and introduces an attrition bias toward mergers 
that take longer to conclude. 
Proposition 2 suggests that the target’s size matters. We include relative size (RSIZE), 
defined as the ratio of the target over bidder market capitalization at t = -20, and a dummy 
(BIG T) for the upper quintile of relative size. Although we exclude reverse mergers, some 
bidders issue more than half of their equity as the consideration paid often exceeds the equity 
price received by the target shareholders. Thus, even if bidders issue more than half of their 
post-issuance equity (e.g., for cash injections), it is not a given that they transfer control to the 
target shareholders. The latter, however, indirectly benefit via hidden earnouts. A dummy 
controls for these mergers (NEW EQ50) as indicated in SDC. 
To test Proposition 3, we measure the market response to hidden earnouts with post-
announcement premiums (PAPs) as explained in Section III C). PAPs are defined as the 
target’s share price after the announcement divided by the announced value of the bid. We use 
                                                        
12 ROIC is earnings before interest and taxes over fixed assets, CI refers to operating costs over revenues, and 
TURNOVER is revenues over fixed assets. 
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market-adjusted premiums with a base price at t = 5 (see Section II B). Five trading days 
should suffice to capture the market’s response, while limiting confounding events. 
To test Proposition 4, we include Tobin’s Q (TQ T, TQ B), defined as the ratio of the 
market value of assets over the book value of assets at t = -20. As in Masulis, Wang, and Xie 
(2007), the market value of assets refers to the book value of assets minus the book value of 
common equity plus the market value of common equity. Tobin’s Q is an overall measure, 
which does not reveal the underlying reason for overvaluation. To identify firm (FIRM T, 
FIRM B), sector (SECTOR T, SECTOR B) and long run overvaluation (LONG T, LONG B), we 
apply the decomposition developed by Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005) 
based on constituents of the S&P 500. Updating constituents annually from 1995-2011 avoids 
a survivorship bias. Following Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005), we regress the value of equity, mit, 
of firm i in year t on the book value of equity, bit. Coefficients α0jt and α1jt vary over time and 
industry j using the 12 Fama-French (1997) industries. 
 
𝑚𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼1𝑗𝑡𝑏𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (6) 
 
Equation (6) constitutes a benchmarking exercise, where market valuation is related to 
a firm’s fundamentals, industry, and time-specific effects. Firm-specific errors refer to the 
observed market value of equity minus the predicted value given a firm’s fundamentals, where 
coefficients vary over time and across industries. Sector related waves in overvaluation are 
equal to the difference in predicted valuations with varying time-industry coefficients and 
predictions based on time averages.13 The difference between predicted valuation based on 
                                                        
13 Coefficients in Equation (6) are averaged over time such that ?̅?1𝑗 =
1
𝑇
∑ 𝛼1𝑗𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1 . 
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time averages and actual fundamentals determines the long run component, which reflects a 
firm’s long run growth potential. Accordingly, firm and sector overvaluation are related to 
Proposition 4, while long run overvaluation can be regarded as a proxy for future growth 
potential and synergies, essential in Proposition 1. 
To test Proposition 5, we compute the S&P 500-adjusted buy and hold returns to the 
target from t = -20 to t = -1 as run-ups (RUNUP) in line with windows suggested by Schwert 
(1996) and Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn (2009). To assess Proposition 7, we follow Shleifer 
and Vishny (1992) and determine the monthly M&A volume (MKT VOL) and the number of 
transactions (MKT BIDS) in an industry based on the two-digit SIC codes of the targets 
(Schlingemann et al., 2002). We also capture a target’s financial health using leverage defined 
as total debt to equity (LEVERAGE), the ratio of short-term debt to long-term debt (SHORT 
DEBT), cash and cash equivalents to total assets (CASH TA), and working capital relative to 
total assets (WC TA). 
In line with Eckbo (2009), dummies account for tender offers (TENDER) and hostile 
bids (HOSTILE). As the first bid may put a target into play, we control for pre-emptive 
bidding with high initial premiums by including a dummy for multiple bids (NUMBID) 
(Fishman, 1988). Analogously, we control for withdrawn bids, which may be due to low 
premiums (WITHDRAWN). Horizontal mergers (HORIZONTAL), defined as matching four-
digit SIC codes, may differ in terms of synergy potential, but also because both parties may be 
jointly affected by industry-specific factors, such as industry debt overhang (Clayton and 
Ravid, 2002) or wider financial distress, which can be contagious within an industry (Lang 
and Stulz, 1992). All accounting-based measures refer to the latest available annual data prior 
to the bid. Section IV introduces additional measures for robustness checks and extensions. 
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III. Empirical Analysis 
A. Descriptive Findings 
Using our standard premium measure (see Section II B), Table II reports the average 
premium is 43.2%, comparable to other samples (Betton et al., 2014). The 25th percentile 
(p25) of all premiums is positive in all years with a mean of 18.5%.14 On average, 8.4% of all 
transactions from 1995-2011 had a negative premium (NEG) with a maximum (minimum) 
share of 14.1% (2.3%) in 2002 (2006). Negative premiums are not marginal errors just below 
zero. Their average size is -15.5%, ranging from -5.1% in 2006 to -27.6% in 2008.15 Table II 
also presents the market response to negative premiums based on cumulative abnormal returns 
to the target (CARs) and post-announcement premiums (PAPs, with a base price at t = 5). 
Negative and positive market reactions are rather balanced with 85 (77) positive and 73 (85) 
negative PAPs (CARs) with fluctuations over time. This supports Propositions 3 and 6 that the 
market responds differently to negative premiums depending upon the underlying cause. 
 
Insert Table II about here. 
 
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the development of daily premiums, defined by the targets’ 
daily stock prices over their announced bids, and target and bidder CARs for mergers where 
                                                        
14 The 25th percentile defines low premiums in Section V. 
15 See Section V for an international comparison of negative premiums. 
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our standard premium measure is negative. A cursory inspection of Figure 1 (for mergers with 
a negative PAP) reveals that the daily premium stays consistently negative, while target CARs 
react positively to negative premium announcements indicating hidden earnouts. Negative 
premiums that increase to positive PAPs (see Figure 2) are accompanied by a sharp drop in 
target CARs indicating a correction of overvaluation. 
 
Insert Figures 1 and 2 about here. 
 
Table III provides the descriptive statistics. In line with the literature (Dong et al., 
2006), we winsorized all variables at the 1st and 99th percentile, which does not affect the 
incidence of negative premiums, as the lowest percentile is negative. 
 
Insert Table III about here. 
 
B. Determinants of Negative Premiums 
Logistic regressions model the binary outcome of a negative premium.16 Specifying 
the reference Model (A) in Table IV requires a trade-off between the discriminatory power of 
covariates and the number of observations. To assess discriminatory power, we conduct 
logistic models with each covariate separately. We select covariates with the largest area under 
the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve with a minimum of 1,776 observations. All 
models account for: 1) industry-specific effects by including dummies for the target’s and the 
                                                        
16 Probit specifications provide similar results. 
25 
bidder’s SIC code and 2) year dummies. All standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity 
using the Huber-White (1980) sandwich estimator. 
Table IV reports the reference Model (A), which identifies the main drivers of negative 
premiums: 1) targets with high Tobin’s Q (TQ T), 2) bidders with low Tobin’s Q (TQ B), 3) 
deals with a large equity portion (EQ), 4) relatively large targets (RSIZE), and 5) industries 
with low M&A transaction volume (MKT VOL). The equity portion of the bid makes hidden 
earnouts more likely as stated by Proposition 1. Relative size is a proxy for the importance of 
synergies and control, demonstrated by Proposition 2. Overvalued targets exhibit more 
negative premiums in line with Proposition 4. Finally, there is evidence in support of 
Proposition 7 as industries with low M&A volume exhibit a higher proportion of negative 
premiums. 
To identify the cause of overvaluation, we decompose valuation levels into firm, 
sector, and long run components. The three components for bidders and targets are correlated 
as bidders with high long run growth potential selecting similar targets. Thus, Model (B) uses 
the target’s components, while Model (C) includes the bidder’s components separately to 
avoid multicollinearity. By construction, decomposition accounts for market movement. 
Therefore, we use the premium measure without index correction (see Section II B). Models 
(B) and (C) indicate that long run growth potential makes negative premiums more likely 
suggesting that hidden earnouts may play a role. This notion is corroborated by the fact that 
less growth-driven, short run overvaluation (firm- and sector-specific) primarily predicts 
premiums that are low, but not necessarily negative. Model (D) includes the direct measure of 
hidden earnouts (HE), which has a highly significant positive impact on the occurrence of 
negative premiums. Moreover, Model (D) accounts for large targets using the dummy BIG T. 
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All partial impacts identified by Model (A) remain in place. In addition, equity issues in 
excess of 50% of the bidder’s market value indicate a significant effect providing further 
support for Proposition 2. Model (E) explores the target’s profitability (ROIC), cost efficiency 
(CI), and asset utilization (TURNOVER), which could indicate synergy potential. These 
accounting measures greatly reduce the number of observations and lack explanatory power. 
To test whether targets with financial constraints are more susceptible to negative 
premiums, Specification (F) adds financial measures. Interestingly, targets with low leverage 
(LEVERAGE) and low working capital (WC TA) are more likely to exhibit negative premiums 
undermining the fire sales hypothesis and Proposition 7. SDC also provides a dummy flagging 
targets that go bankrupt during the transaction and the amount of capital infusion into the 
target during the transaction (normalized over the target’s market value at t = -20). Both 
variables are dropped from the estimation as they perfectly predict positive premiums, 
contradicting Proposition 7. Section IV considers additional measures for financial constraints, 
distress, and stock market liquidity. 
 
Insert Table IV about here. 
 
To test Proposition 5, we use a premium measure with a base price at t = -1 so that the 
measurement periods for run-ups (t = -20 to t = -1) and premiums do not overlap. Table V 
reports the reference Model (A) using a base price at t = -1 in Column (G). In support of 
Proposition 5, Column (H) indicates that run-ups have a positive impact on the likelihood of 
negative premiums. 
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It is not clear, however, whether run-ups reflect an overvaluation of the target’s 
fundamental value or an overestimation of expected merger gains for the target. In a first step, 
we control for the decomposed valuation levels in Columns (I) and (J). If run-ups only reflect 
fundamental overvaluation, we would expect to see no effect of run-ups and a positive and 
significant impact of FIRM T or SECTOR T. We find that the predictive power of run-ups for 
short-term negative premiums remains intact. In a second step, we include the interaction term 
between run-ups and Tobin’s Q (RUNUPxTQ T) in Column (K). If run-ups merely reflect an 
increase in Tobin’s Q, the interaction term would be positive. However, in support of 
Proposition 5, the interaction term is negative and significant. Moreover, Column (L) 
considers the interaction between run-ups and the M&A transaction volume in the industry 
(RUNUPxVOL) revealing a positive coefficient. Industries with high M&A activity and high 
run-ups lead to negative premiums due to overstated takeover expectations, as the market 
seems to anticipate further bids in the industry. Accordingly, run-ups capture an overshooting 
of takeover expectations, which differs from the overvaluation of a target’s stand-alone value. 
 
Insert Table V about here. 
 
C. Market Reaction to Negative Premiums 
Following Amemiya (1985) and Liao (1994), we specify sequential logistic models for 
two steps: 1) whether a premium is positive or negative and 2) how the market responds to 
negative premiums. The logistic models presented thus far address the first step, isolating 
overvaluation and hidden earnouts as the most promising explanations. The second step 
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focuses on these explanations. Propositions 3 and 6 also provide theoretical predictions 
regarding discriminating market reactions to negative premiums. 
To test Proposition 3, we need to stress that hidden earnouts are present in all stock 
mergers (Lemma 1). This increases the chance that the announcement return to hidden 
earnouts is confounded with possible effects of target overvaluation. Overvalued targets 
trigger a negative announcement return, which can overcompensate for the positive 
announcement effect of hidden earnouts.17 Thus, although negative announcement returns can 
reliably identify overvaluation in negative premiums (see Section I C), they partially hide 
hidden earnouts. 
While overvalued stock mergers always have hidden earnouts, mergers with hidden 
earnouts are not always overvalued. We can distinguish the positive effects of hidden earnouts 
from the negative effects of overvaluation by benchmarking the market reaction to the bid, as 
in the post-announcement premium (PAP). The PAP refers to the target’s share price shortly 
after the announcement at t = 5 divided by the value of the bid. The PAP clearly identifies 
cases where the post-announcement value of the target: 1) exceeds the bid due to hidden 
earnouts or 2) does not exceed the bid due to the absence of hidden earnouts. 
The positive announcement returns of the target’s shares suggested by Proposition 3 
imply that the post-announcement premium (PAP) remains negative as the anticipation of 
hidden earnouts should prevent the target’s price adjustment from hitting or undercutting the 
bid price. In fact, as indicated below, the average target return (CAR T) is positive when 
premiums stay negative after their announcement. This indicates that PAPs successfully 
                                                        
17 Suppose a target with a market capitalization of 100 and a fair value of 80 accepts a stock-for-stock bid of 90 
with hidden earnouts of five. The offer premium is negative [90/(80+20)-1], the post-merger premium is positive 
[(90+5)/80-1], but the target’s announcement return is negative as the market capitalization falls from 100 to 95. 
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identify hidden earnouts. Thus, the dependent variable takes a value of one for negative PAPs 
and zero otherwise. This estimation procedure corresponds to the previous section. 
Table VI underscores the notion that the signs of the coefficients of the target’s and the 
bidder’s Tobin’s Q change compared to Tables IV and V indicating that PAPs distinguish 
between hidden earnouts and overvaluation. Column (M) reports that bidders with high 
valuation (TQ B) exhibit a market reaction in line with hidden earnouts. This is consistent with 
the Q theory of mergers (Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2002). However, decomposing valuation 
levels in Columns (N) and (O) do not confirm these findings. Columns (P) and (Q) add the 
direct measure of hidden earnouts (HE), which has explanatory power. In addition, Column 
(Q) provides robustness to the inclusion of abnormal returns (CAR T, CAR B) and 
demonstrates that the market reacts positively to the announcement of negative premiums 
when they expect hidden earnouts. Positive CARs for both the targets and the bidders can also 
be interpreted as proxies of high expected synergies. 
In Columns (P), (Q), and (R), the dummy for large targets (BIG T) and the interaction 
term between large targets and the equity portion of the bid (EQxBIG T) clearly identify 
hidden earnouts. Based on these two coefficients, it is evident that a target needs to be large 
and the deal requires a substantial equity portion to observe the market reaction expected from 
hidden earnouts. 
Most specifications indicate that horizontal mergers are associated with hidden 
earnouts, consistent with the view that these mergers promise higher synergies. Finally, 
Column (R) includes run-ups and confirms that speculative overvaluation cannot explain a 
market reaction consistent with hidden earnouts. 
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These findings support Proposition 3 and correspond to our findings in the first step 
(Tables IV and V). There is, however, one striking exception. Although the equity portion 
(EQ) is a strong and consistent predictor of negative premiums, it fails to discriminate between 
hidden earnouts and overvaluation as the underlying cause except in combination with large 
targets (EQxBIG T). Previous studies find that higher target valuations are associated with a 
greater likelihood of all-equity bids and with lower premiums (Dong et al., 2006; Betton et al., 
2008). Our results are in line with these findings. If equity bids are more likely for deals with 
high target (mis)valuations, as well as high hidden earnouts, the equity portion cannot 
distinguish between the two underlying reasons for negative premiums. The combination of a 
high equity portion and a large target, however, leads to hidden earnouts in line with 
Proposition 2. 
 
Insert Table VI about here. 
 
Proposition 6 states that the announcement of a negative premium due to overvaluation 
should trigger negative target abnormal returns. As only the sign of this reaction matters, our 
sequential logistic models use a binary dependent variable that distinguishes between a 
negative abnormal return (1 if CAR T < 0) and a non-negative return (0 if CAR T ≥ 0). Table 
VII reports the basic Specification (S), replacing Tobin’s Q with decomposed valuation levels 
in Specifications (T) and (U), adding run-ups in Specification (V), the interaction effect 
between run-ups and the target’s valuation in Specification (W), the direct measure of hidden 
earnouts in Specification (X), and the bidder’s abnormal market response, as well as proxies 
for liquidity in Specification (Y). 
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The dummy for hostile takeovers is omitted since all negative premiums with a 
negative market response refer to friendly deals. All of the specifications indicate that a 
negative market response is more likely if the target is overvalued (TQ T) or the market 
overstates the target’s gain from mergers captured by run-ups (RUNUP) and the interaction 
term (RUNUPxTQ T). Specification (T) reveals that firm- and sector-specific overvaluation 
(FIRM T, SECTOR T) explains a negative market response, thus supporting Proposition 6. 
Neither the proxies for hidden earnouts (EQ, RSIZE) nor the direct measure (HE) are 
significant in the second step supporting our notion that negative premiums with a negative 
abnormal return are due to overvaluation.18 
Run-ups not only predict negative premiums (see Table V), but also a downward 
market correction (see Specifications (V)-(Y) in Table VII). Taking these two findings 
together, we can infer that excessive run-ups are neither a mere symptom of hidden earnouts 
nor of fundamental overvaluation, but constitute a reason for negative premiums in their own 
right. This is in line with Ang and Ismail (2015). Specification (Y) demonstrates that the effect 
of run-ups is also robust to the inclusion of the market reaction to the bidder. A greater 
likelihood for a negative market response is associated with a lower CAR B indicating that 
bidder shareholders are skeptical about deals where target overvaluation may be the reason for 
negative premiums. Specification (Y) tests liquidity as a competing explanation, but without 
support. 
 
                                                        
18 For robustness, we also used a propensity score matching approach, where we compare matched samples of the 
targets with similar valuation levels (and other characteristics) prior to the merger announcements and compare 
their market responses after the announcement. The results corroborate our findings above. We find that the 
observed target market responses are caused by hidden earnouts or overvaluation events and not by the targets’ 
characteristics as the matched sample (i.e., targets with similar characteristics) exhibits a distinctly different 
market response. Details regarding the methodology and results are available from the authors upon request. 
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Insert Table VII about here. 
 
IV. Robustness and Extensions 
A. Alternative Measures of Premiums 
We re-estimate our models for different premium measures, which vary in terms of 
base price and market adjustments discussed in Section II B. Table W1 in the Web Appendix 
B reports the reference Model (A) for six alternative premium measures. (R1) refers to our 
standard base price at t = -20, but excludes slightly negative premiums, which may be due to 
noise, by coding negative premiums that are smaller than -5% with a dummy equal to one. 
(R2) refers to our standard base price at t = -20, but without adjusting for changes in the S&P 
500 Index. (R3) and (R4) compute index-adjusted premiums with a base price at t = -5 and t = 
-1, respectively. (R5) refers to the average of the index-adjusted target share prices at t = -20, t 
= -5, and t = -1. Finally, (R6) applies an index-adjusted base price at t = -40. Our results do not 
depend on the premium measure. 
 
B. Cash Mergers and Multiple Bids 
Negative premiums exhibit a high equity portion (EQ). However, we stress that 23 
negative premiums occur in cash mergers. Thus, the method of payment is not a guarantee for 
observing positive premiums. To account for the possibility that other factors affect the 
method of payment as outlined in Eckbo (2009), Table W2 in the Web Appendix B shows our 
reference Models (A) and (B) excluding cash mergers in (R7) and (R8), respectively. 
Apparently, our results are robust. Finally, (R9) and (R10) remove multiple bids stressing that 
the number of bids does not affect our findings. 
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C. Other Control Variables 
In unreported robustness checks, we also test the following control variables from 
SDC: 1) cash infusion into the target, 2) bankruptcy of the target, 3) cash earnouts in percent 
of the bid price, 4) a dummy for shareholder litigation, 5) termination fees, 6) lockup options, 
and 7) for collars.19 The results reported in this paper remain qualitatively unchanged. As 
explained in Section III B, some of these controls lack the necessary variation for inclusion in 
the reference model. 
 
D. Extension to Stock Liquidity and Other Proxies of Financial Health 
Next to liquidity discounts in the market for corporate control, low liquidity in the 
stock market can also affect negative premiums. If a target’s stock is rarely traded, its price is 
less likely to correct for a possible overvaluation in a timely manner. As explained in Section 
I, this can lead to negative premiums. Moreover, M&As can present discounted exit 
opportunities if the target’s stocks are illiquid (Greenwood and Schor, 2009). 
As tick data is not available for many targets in our sample, we construct measures 
based on daily closing prices from t = -250 to t = 10. We estimate the effective bid-ask spread 
based on the covariance of subsequent changes in closing prices (SPREAD) and the proportion 
of days per month with zero returns (ZERO) as defined in Roll (1984) and Lesmond, Ogden, 
and Trzcinka (1999), respectively. 
                                                        
19 Collars define floors and/or caps for bidder stock prices within which the exchange ratio is fixed (Officer, 
2004, 2006). In our model, a collar breach constitutes a new bid. In a new bid, initially negative premiums can 
become positive and vice versa. For negative premiums in the initial, focal bid, however, collars do not affect our 
findings. Analogously, this also applies to termination fees and lockup options if executed. 
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We also compute and test alternative proxies for a target’s financial health including 
Altman’s Z-score (Z SCORE), a dummy for distressed targets based on a Z-score below 1.23 
(Z DISS) (Altman, Haldeman, and Narayanan, 1977), and the WW index for financial 
constraints (Whited and Wu, 2006). The WW index is a linear combination of cash flow to 
total assets, sales growth, long-term debt to total assets, the log of total assets, dividend policy 
indicators, and industry sales growth. 
Table W3 in the Web Appendix B presents the results for stock market liquidity in 
(E1) measured by SPREAD and ZERO. Both do not explain negative premiums. (E2) includes 
Z DISS and (E3) contains Altman’s Z SCORE. Both measures of financial distress do not have 
explanatory power. Finally, (E4) incorporates WW, which is significant and positive, 
highlighting that financially constrained targets are more likely to accept negative premiums. 
Note, however, that the inclusion of WW, Z DISS, and Z SCORE results in a considerable loss 
of cases. Overall, the results provide only weak evidence for market liquidity and financial 
distress. 
 
E. Extension to Low Premiums (LPs) 
Negative premiums are the most extreme and distinctive outcome of the much larger 
phenomenon of low premiums (LPs), defined as the lowest quartile of all premiums. Most LPs 
are non-negative premiums (see Table II). Note that LPs include sizeable, positive premiums. 
The premium at the 25th percentile is 18.5%. 
The same theory that explains negative premiums also generalizes to LPs as hidden 
earnouts, overvaluation, and liquidity effects potentially always exist, diminishing premiums 
in general. Accordingly, all propositions in Section I also apply to lower premiums. 
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To test this conjecture, we rerun the estimations in Table IV with dummies for LPs as 
the dependent variable. Table W4 in Web Appendix B reports the results. The main findings, 
including the positive impact of the target’s valuation (TQ T), equity portion (EQ), relative 
size (RSIZE, the measure of hidden earnouts (HE), and the negative impact of market volume 
(MKT VOL), are not affected by the inclusion of low positive premiums. In fact, a target’s 
overvaluation, as measured by decomposed valuation levels in (E6) and (E7), seems to be a 
stronger predictor for LPs than for negative premiums. Overall, the results provide evidence 
that the proposed mechanisms behind negative premiums generalize to at least 25% of all 
premiums. 
 
F. Extension across Samples 
To derive a clean sample of offer premiums, we focus on a subset of U.S. American 
domestic takeovers after excluding a number of counterfactuals (see Section II A). The 
question arises to which extent our results generalize to other takeover markets and what role 
possible counterfactuals play. Table VIII reports the occurrence and size of negative 
premiums across three regional samples and for different types of deals, targets, and 
counterfactuals. To compile Table VIII, we did not conduct the manual checking procedure. 
We only accounted for the most important measurement errors, as shown in Table VIII, such 
as self-dealing as reported in the SDC. This approach is acceptable for providing a descriptive 
overview, but not sufficient for deriving a “clean sample” as outlined in Section II A. 
Negative premiums are clearly a worldwide phenomenon. There is little variation across 
regions in frequency and magnitude. North America, including Canada (AM), has slightly 
fewer negative premiums than Europe (EU) and the Asia-Pacific, including Japan (AP), but 
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there is virtually no difference in the median size of the negative premiums.20 The upper panel 
of Table VIII (WHOLE SAMPLE) reports the most prominent counterfactuals for negative 
premiums: 1) self-dealing (mainly mergers with the same ultimate parent), 2) bidders with 
toeholds, 3) mandatory bids, and 4) reverse mergers. These counterfactuals play a more 
important role in EU and AP than in AM. The lower panel of Table VIII (SUBSAMPLE) 
reports a break up for the most prominent types of deals and targets after excluding 
counterfactuals. In line with the results from our analyses, deals with full payment in STOCK 
(CASH) clearly have a higher (lower) proportion of negative premiums across all three 
regions. This also applies, but to a lesser extent, to WITHDRAWN bids and HORIZONTAL 
targets. HOSTILE and TENDER offers and CROSSBORDER targets receive fewer bids with 
negative premiums across all regions, while the number of bidding competition (NUMBID) 
does not seem to play a distinct role. Overall, the pattern of relative importance of deal and 
target types for negative premiums is quite similar across regions. 
 
Insert Table VIII about here. 
 
G. Alternative Windows for Cumulated Abnormal Returns 
Assessing the market response to hidden earnouts, Specification (Q) in Table VI relies 
on a standard window from t = -1 to t = 1 in line with Dong et al. (2006), which might be too 
short to capture the market response to hidden earnouts. Thus, Table W5 in Web Appendix B 
reports alternative windows for the bidder’s and the target’s cumulated abnormal returns based 
on [-1,5] in E(11), [-1,20] in E(12), and [-1,60] in E(13) (i.e., until five, 20, or 60 days after 
                                                        
20 Depending upon the sample, the median lies between -10.5% and -12.4% or between -9.6% and -11.6%. 
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the announcement). Positive target cumulated abnormal returns significantly predict negative 
PAPs throughout all of the windows. This corroborates the notion that hidden earnouts are at 
work, which are reflected in consistently higher target prices (relative to the announced bids) 
as the expected synergies are compounded in the market price (but not or only partly in the 
announced bid). This can also be seen in Figure 1. Interestingly, the market seems to adjust 
the bidder’s share price quickly and in the short run, but not structurally, as only the window 
[-1,1] has a significant impact. This is not against expectations as the hidden earnouts accrue 
to the target only, while the bidder gives up expected synergies in return for a lower price 
today. In the short run, bidder shareholders might value the fact that both merger parties 
apparently expect substantial synergies (so that hidden earnouts and negative premiums are an 
option) or that the bidder takes less risk in anticipated synergies (by paying a lower price), but 
this effect is, all else being equal, not very strong. 
 
H. Alternative Proxies of Overvaluation 
Apart from Tobin’s Q and its decomposed components, we consider alternative 
measures suggested in the pertinent literature. Despite decomposition, it is still possible that a 
high Q can suggest overvaluation and/or high expectations concerning future growth and 
profitability, as implied by Q-theory in Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002). In line with Dong et 
al. (2006), we use the price-to-residual income model value (PRIMV) to capture overvaluation. 
The PRIMV refers to the Ohlson model and is usually based on earnings forecasts (Ohlson, 
1995). Dong et al. (2006) use I/B/E/S data to obtain analysts’ consensus earnings forecasts. 
Analysts’ forecasts are not available for most targets. Thus, we use actual earnings and not 
forecasts to construct the price-to-residual income model value. Dong et al. (2006) determine 
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the cost of equity using a market model to estimate beta. Yet, they admit substantial variation 
in their estimates, which they resolve with winsorization. Even after winsorization, estimates 
for cost of equity lead to extreme fundamental values, as estimates vary between 3% and 30%. 
To avoid outliers, we follow D’Mello and Shroff (2000) and use a constant discount rate of 
12.5%. Furthermore, in line with Dong et al. (2006), the computation refers to a three-year 
window. 
Based on the functional fixation hypothesis, firms with high accruals and net operating 
assets tend to be overvalued as investors overstate accounting performance (Hirshleifer, Hou, 
Teoh, and Zhang, 2004; Sloan, 1996). Thus, for robustness, we also compute operating 
accruals (ACCR) and net operating assets (NOA) as discussed in Hirshleifer et al. (2004). 
Unfortunately, quarterly accounting data do not cover the whole investigation period. 
Therefore, all accounting-related measures, including ACCR and NOA, use the latest available 
annual data prior to the bid announcement. Due to the high demands on the data, however, 
these alternative proxies reduced the sample size from 1,767 in the reference Model (A) to 617 
in Model (E14), 694 in Model (E15), and 587 in Model (E16), respectively (see Table W6). 
Note that only PRIMV T is significant in Model (E16). The significant reduction in the sample 
limits the usefulness of alternative proxies. Moreover, these measures are also affected by 
growth expectations, which could manifest themselves as overvaluation. Accordingly, our 
decomposition approach based on the readily available Tobin’s Q seems to be a better 
approach. 
 
I. Agency Theory and Negative Premiums 
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Theoretically, we argue that agency costs cannot explain negative premiums in the 
absence of information asymmetries. In practice, this is unlikely to hold. Thus, our empirical 
analysis considers the impact of agency costs and information asymmetry on negative 
premiums. As with hidden earnouts and synergies, agency costs are notoriously difficult to 
measure. We acknowledge that the results must be interpreted with great care, particularly as 
data limitations restrict us to small samples. The recent study by Luypaert and Van Caneghem 
(2017) uses analysts’ forecasts and media coverage, which is not available for most of our 
targets. Thus, we have to rely on alternative proxies. Model (E) in Table IV uses measures, 
such as CASH TA, ROIC and CI, which can be interpreted as proxies for agency costs related 
to Jensen’s (1986) Free Cash Flow Hypothesis and efficiency. Yet, the same measures can 
also influence synergies and are, at best, an indirect measure of agency costs. 
A more direct measure refers to current discretionary accruals, which can be regarded 
as a proxy for managerial discretion based on agency theory (Sawicki and Shrestha, 2008, 
2012). We decompose accruals into nondiscretionary accruals, NDA, and discretionary 
accruals, DA, by estimating a modified Jones model (Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney, 1995). We 
run the following fixed effects model to determine non-discretionary accruals, where TA refers 
to total assets, Rev indicates sales, and NR stands for net receivables. 
 
𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽
1
𝑇
𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾
Δ𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡−Δ𝑁𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡   (7) 
 
The residuals of Regression (7) are discretionary accruals, while the fitted values refer 
to non-discretionary accruals. Table W7 reports our reference Model (A), shown in Table IV, 
compared to (E17), which incorporates discretionary, DA, and non-discretionary accruals NDA 
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for the targets and the acquirers. Apparently, higher discretionary accruals do not explain 
negative premiums. 
We also account for the effect of asymmetric information using bid-ask spreads. As 
tick data is not available for many targets, we construct measures based on daily closing prices 
from t = -250 to t = 10. We estimate the effective bid-ask spread based on the covariance of 
subsequent changes in closing prices, SPREAD, as defined in Roll (1984). Empirically, 
effective bid-ask spreads included in Model (E18) of Table W7 do not explain the negative 
premiums. 
(E19) extends our analysis to very low premiums (the bottom 25%) revealing no 
significant partial impacts of our measures. However, in the higher quantiles (the top 25%) 
shown in (E20), agency costs matter. The latter finding is interesting as it indicates that agency 
costs are better concealed in the case of relatively high premiums (i.e., in the top 25% of 
premiums). In this subgroup of mergers, high discretionary accruals lower premiums. Due to 
high data requirements, our results for agency costs and information asymmetry need to be 
interpreted with caution as the sample size reduces to values between 590 and 491. 
 
V. Conclusion 
Prior research often truncated or removed negative premiums, regarding them as noise. 
We develop and test three theoretical explanations for negative premiums: 1) hidden earnouts, 
2) overvaluation, and 3) market liquidity. 
 
A. Hidden Earnouts 
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Any bid with an equity portion, where the bidder benefits from the acquisition, implies 
that target shareholders participate in the bidder’s share of joint synergies through their 
ownership of the merged entity. These earnouts cannot be announced in the initial bid. They 
are hidden and must exist, as shown in Lemma 1. Proposition 1 proves that hidden earnouts 
explain negative premiums if synergies are sufficient. Negative offer premiums together with 
positive hidden earnouts result in a positive post-merger premium, fulfilling the target 
shareholders’ participation constraint. To stay in control, bidders need to offer negative 
premiums together with hidden earnouts if the target is large (see Proposition 2). Our 
empirical results provide clear support for hidden earnouts as one explanation for negative 
premiums. Table IV demonstrates that bids with high equity portions and relative size trigger 
negative premiums. Our direct measure of hidden earnouts, based on Lemma 1, has 
explanatory power. Decomposing valuation levels based on Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005) reveals 
that targets and bidders with high long run growth expectations and, as such, more synergy 
potential for hidden earnouts, exhibit negative premiums. The market should respond 
positively to the announcement of negative offer premiums with hidden earnouts (see 
Proposition 3). Sequential logistic regressions confirm this assertion (see Table VI). High-Q 
bidders signaling high joint synergies explain a positive market reaction to negative offer 
premiums. Our direct measure of hidden earnouts and large targets in combination with high 
equity portions also make a positive market response more likely. 
 
B. Overvaluation 
Proposition 4 focuses on the fundamental overvaluation of a target’s stand-alone value. 
Logistic models confirm that targets with high Tobin’s Q explain negative premiums (see 
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Table IV). Proposition 5 states that excessive run-ups, capturing overstated expected gains 
from mergers, can also cause negative premiums. Table V indicates that the likelihood of 
negative premiums increases in run-ups. Using interaction terms between run-ups and the 
target’s Tobin’s Q, as well as the market volume of M&As in the industry, underscores the 
fact that run-ups represent a separate explanation. Sequential logistic models confirm that the 
market reacts negatively to the announcement of negative premiums for overvalued targets. 
Targets with high firm and sector-specific overvaluation exhibit a market response in line with 
Proposition 6. 
 
C. Market Liquidity 
Proposition 7 explores the role of liquidity in the market for corporate control. We find 
only statistically weak support for the relevance of transaction volumes for negative premiums 
(Table IV). Related factors pertaining to fire sales lack explanatory power. The results also 
provide only limited support that financially constrained targets are prone to negative 
premiums and no support that illiquid target stock plays a role (Table W3). One could argue 
that marketability discounts due to block holding could partly explain negative premiums. 
Pratt (2009) contends that marketability discounts are in the region of 13.0% to 45.0%. 
Reported discounts must be interpreted with caution, due to data availability, small samples, 
and often hand-collected data (Dlugosz, Fahlenbrach, Gompers, and Metrick, 2006). Our 
study uses bid-ask spreads and zero returns as proxies as ownership data is not available for a 
sufficient number of targets. These proxies do not explain the negative premiums. 
Our findings go beyond negative premiums and hold for low positive premiums. In 
extensions, we find that our theory and empirical results can be generalized to the bottom 25% 
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of all premiums, which include positive takeover premiums that reach a magnitude of 18.5%. 
In fact, some determinants (e.g., firm and sector-specific overvaluation) are more powerful 
predictors for low premiums than for negative premiums alone. Managerial implications of our 
results include the direct estimation of hidden earnouts, derived from our model, which can be 
used to negotiate lower offer prices. In conclusion, the paper provides theoretical and 
empirical evidence that negative premiums do exist and are a rational phenomenon. Negative 
premiums should not be ignored; they should be studied. 
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Figure I. CARs and Daily Premiums (Current Target Stock Price/Announced Bid-1) for a Sample 
with Negative PREMIUM (t = −20) and Negative Post-Announcement Premiums (PAP, t = 5). 
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Figure II. CARs and Daily Premiums (Current Target Stock Price/Announced Bid-1) for a Sample 
with Negative PREMIUM (t = −20) and Positive Post-Announcement Premiums (PAP, t = 5). 
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Table I. Variables and Definitions 
 
Variables Definition 
 
Prior to announcement: 
KT,KB Target’s (bidder’s) share price 
NT,NB Target’s (bidder’s) number of shares outstanding 
vT,vB Target’s (bidder’s) market value of equity 
vfT,vfB Target’s (bidder’s) fundamental value of equity 
δT Target’s mispricing defined as vT - vfT 
vlT Target’s (expected) liquidity value 
 
At announcement: 
b Value of bid 
p Offer premium p ∈ [−1,∞] 
e Equity portion of bid, e ∈ [0,1] 
X Number of bidder shares exchanged for each target share 
λ Target’s share of synergies announced in bid, λ ∈ [0,1] 
l Liquidity discount of bid 
 
After consummation: 
bm Post-merger value of bid 
pm Post-merger premium, pm ∈ [0,∞] 
ξ Target’s fraction of equity ownership in merged entity 
KM Share price of merged entity 
s Synergies of merged entity 
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Table II. Existence of Negative Premiums 
 
N (all) is the number of all non-missing offer premiums in our sample with a base price at t = -20. PREM is the average offer 
premium, while NEG indicates the number of negative premiums and their average value. PAP pos (neg) refers to the number 
of non-negative (negative) post-announcement premiums with a base price at t = 5 after a negative offer premium. Four deals 
have missing base prices at t = 5 resulting in 85 + 73 = 158 post-announcement premiums. CAR pos (neg) refers to the number 
of non-negative (negative) cumulative abnormal returns to the target from t = -1 to t = 1 given the offer premium is negative. 
The sum of CAR pos (CAR neg) is equal to the number of NEG (reported as % of N). Total refers to the number of observations 
(N, PAP, CAR), averages (avg %, % of N), and 25th percentiles (p25). 
 
 N PREM PREM NEG NEG PAP CAR 
 (all) (avg %) (p25) (% of N) (avg %) pos (neg) pos (neg) 
1995 115 40.55 22.44 6.96 -17.23 2 (6) 2 (6) 
1996 143 36.64 14.58 10.49 -9.27 10 (5) 7 (8) 
1997 191 35.49 14.36 11.52 -13.61 10 (12) 7 (15) 
1998 217 48.58 19.26 9.68 -10.79 14 (7) 9 (12) 
1999 224 55.95 28.32 6.25 -14.58 8 (5) 7 (7) 
2000 209 50.25 19.39 10.05 -17.25 12 (8) 14 (7) 
2001 131 46.81 14.01 12.98 -20.90 8 (8) 10 (7) 
2002 64 42.80 15.59 14.06 -19.82 7 (1) 4 (5) 
2003 81 42.89 18.86 6.17 -19.42 1 (4) 3 (2) 
2004 78 30.89 9.15 14.10 -17.31 5 (6) 5 (6) 
2005 83 31.08 16.34 6.02 -10.08 2 (3) 1 (4) 
2006 86 35.30 19.97 2.33 -5.08 1 (1) 2 (0) 
2007 98 32.68 15.70 4.08 -15.39 2 (2) 2 (2) 
2008 73 44.18 23.06 5.48 -27.55 2 (2) 2 (2) 
2009 55 48.78 18.94 1.82 -23.01 1 (0) 0 (1) 
2010 66 51.56 24.48 3.03 -22.16 0 (2) 1 (1) 
2011 23 26.69 16.96 4.35 -17.47 0 (1) 1 (0) 
Total 1937 43.24 18.49 8.36 -15.48 85 (73) 77 (85) 
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Table III. Descriptive Statistics 
 
T (B) refers to the target (bidder). PREMIUM is the offer premium with a base price at t = -20. RUNUP is the market adjusted buy 
and hold return to the target from t = -20 to t = -1. TQ is Tobin’s Q. CAR is the market-adjusted cumulative abnormal return from 
t = -1 to t = 1. FIRM, SECTOR, and LONG are the decomposed valuation levels. HE is the direct measure of hidden earnouts. EQ 
is the percentage of equity offered. NEW EQ50 indicates whether bidders issue more than 50% of equity. RSIZE is the ratio of the 
target over bidder market value at t = -20. BIG T indicates whether the target is larger than the bidder. MKT BIDS and MKT VOL 
is the monthly frequency and deal volume of all domestic M&As in the two-digit SIC target industry. LEVERAGE is total debt to 
equity, SHORT DEBT is short over long-term debt, CASH TA is cash and cash equivalents over total assets, and WC TA is 
working capital over total assets. ROIC is earnings before interest and taxes over fixed assets, TURNOVER is revenues over fixed 
assets, and CI is operating costs over revenues. NUMBID is a dummy for more than one bidder. TENDER is a dummy for tender 
offers. HORIZONTAL is a dummy for mergers in the same four-digit SIC industry. WITHDRAWN is a dummy for withdrawn 
offers. HOSTILE is a dummy for mergers that SDC classifies as hostile. 
 
 N mean sd min p25 p50 p75 max 
PREMIUM 1,937 43.24 41.08 -45.53 18.50 35.76 60.78 213.34 
RUNUP 1,935 0.09 0.20 -0.38 -0.03 0.05 0.17 0.85 
TQ T 1,927 2.45 2.61 0.54 1.21 1.63 2.52 18.46 
TQ B 1,781 3.22 3.81 0.74 1.45 2.06 3.19 27.05 
CAR T 1,910 0.22 0.25 -0.26 0.05 0.18 0.33 1.25 
CAR B 1,892 -0.02 0.08 -0.28 -0.06 -0.01 0.02 0.26 
FIRM T 1,841 -0.88 1.25 -7.16 -1.64 -0.91 -0.19 5.83 
FIRM B 1,745 -0.45 1.30 -6.80 -1.14 -0.48 0.24 7.54 
SECTOR T 1,841 -0.04 1.02 -8.65 -0.38 -0.06 0.43 3.59 
SECTOR B 1,775 -0.04 0.97 -8.66 -0.27 -0.04 0.37 2.76 
LONG T 1,841 1.83 0.64 0.93 1.53 1.80 1.93 5.33 
LONG B 1,775 1.74 0.63 0.88 1.41 1.68 1.83 5.25 
HE 1,848 -0.08 0.14 -0.76 -0.09 -0.01 0.00 0.09 
EQ 1,937 54.58 46.96 0.00 0.00 75.16 100.00 100.00 
NEW EQ50 1,937 0.03 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
RSIZE 1,879 0.31 0.46 0.00 0.04 0.14 0.39 2.99 
BIG T 1,937 0.18 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
MKT BIDS 1,922 32.12 37.83 1.00 8.00 15.00 32.00 156.00 
MKT VOL 1,922 3.72 7.15 0.00 0.44 1.32 3.55 44.34 
LEVERAGE 1,523 0.55 1.17 -1.71 0.06 0.25 0.61 8.66 
SHORT DEBT 1,343 0.36 0.35 0.00 0.05 0.23 0.64 1.00 
CASH TA 1,905 0.22 0.24 0.00 0.03 0.13 0.37 0.88 
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Table IV. Determinants of Negative Premiums Using Logistic Regressions 
 
(A) is the reference model. (B) and (C) decompose valuation levels. (D) includes the direct measure of hidden earnouts and accounts 
for large targets. (E) focuses on targets’ profitability, while (F) on targets’ financial health. We account for industry-specific effects 
with dummies for targets’ and bidders’ SIC codes and include year dummies. Standard errors refer to the Huber-White (1980) 
estimator.  ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, and ∗∗∗p < 0.001. 
 
 (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) 
TQ T 0.144***   0.156*** 0.124* 0.097** 
TQ B -0.094*   -0.116* -0.142* -0.060 
FIRM T  0.061     
SECTOR T  0.185     
LONG T  0.480*     
FIRM B   -0.019    
SECTOR B   0.139    
LONG B   0.566**    
EQ 0.010*** 0.014*** 0.012*** 0.018*** 0.019*** 0.011* 
NEW EQ50 0.597 0.160 0.227 1.346* 1.162 0.087 
RSIZE 0.772*** 1.030*** 0.779*** 0.736** 0.600 0.822** 
BIG T    0.485 0.339  
HE    19.968*** 26.404***  
ROIC     -0.003  
TURNOVER     0.177  
CI     0.116  
MKT BIDS -0.004 -0.007 -0.007 0.003 0.004 0.000 
MKT VOL -0.070* -0.045* -0.039* -0.063** -0.072* -0.140*** 
LEVERAGE      -0.373* 
SHORT DEBT      0.238 
CASH TA      1.521 
WC TA      -1.416* 
LIAB      0.175 
NUMBID 0.511 0.175 0.232 0.024 -0.003 0.692 
TENDER -0.426 -0.370 -0.441 -0.399 -0.455 -0.396 
HORIZONTAL 0.135 0.286 0.114 0.222 0.439 0.216 
WITHDRAWN 0.230 0.309 0.329 0.257 0.100 0.165 
HOSTILE -0.310 -0.081 -0.175 0.035 0.597 -0.582 
ll -416.472 -401.685 -399.491 -327.13 -188.767 -224.587 
aic 910.944 889.369 866.981 744.26 427.534 543.175 
bic 1,124.548 1,125.052 1,052.599 990.034 552.611 775.092 
r2 p 0.149 0.159 0.149 0.307 0.33 0.171 
N 1,767 1,774 1,736 1,740 1,100 1,027 
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Table V. Run-ups 
 
Logistic regressions with negative premiums as dependent. Premiums refer to t = 1 so that measurement periods for run-ups (t = 
20 to t = 1) and premiums do not overlap. (G) re-estimates our reference Model (A) (see Table IV). (H) includes run-ups. (I) and 
(J) replace Tobin's Q with firm, sector, and long run overvaluation. (K) considers the interaction term between run-ups and Tobin's 
Q (RUNUPxTQ T). (L) uses the interaction between run-ups and the M&A transaction volume in the industry (RUNUPxVOL). 
We account for industry-specific effects with dummies for targets’ and bidders’ SIC codes and include year dummies. Standard 
errors refer to the Huber-White (1980) estimator. ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, and ∗∗∗p < 0.001. 
 
 (G) (H) (I) (J) (K) (L) 
TQ T 0.127*** 0.125***   0.166*** 0.128*** 
TQ B -0.061 -0.069   -0.063 -0.073 
RUNUP  1.576** 1.574** 1.323** 2.701*** 1.156* 
RUNUPxTQ T     -0.322**  
RUNUPxVOL      0.116* 
FIRM T   -0.116    
SECTOR T   -0.028    
LONG T   0.128    
FIRM B    -0.240   
SECTOR B    -0.046   
LONG B    0.391   
EQ 0.008** 0.008** 0.011*** 0.010** 0.008** 0.008** 
NEW EQ50 0.338 0.325 -0.037 0.322 0.321 0.328 
RSIZE 0.542** 0.652*** 0.926*** 0.524* 0.669*** 0.667*** 
MKT BIDS 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 
MKT VOL -0.036 -0.035 -0.037 -0.036 -0.035 -0.066* 
NUMBID 0.527 0.489 0.442 0.330 0.504 0.513 
TENDER -0.432 -0.475 -0.580 -0.327 -0.521 -0.452 
HORIZONTAL -0.036 -0.019 0.013 -0.093 -0.005 -0.007 
WITHDRAWN -0.298 -0.267 -0.524 -0.110 -0.290 -0.293 
HOSTILE -0.929 -0.778 0.000 0.000 -0.712 -0.783 
ll -449.331 -443.020 -425.209 -417.791 -437.834 -440.791 
aic 976.662 972.041 936.417 919.581 943.667 965.581 
bic 1,190.223 1,207.505 1,169.088 1,145.865 1,129.848 1,195.569 
r2 p 0.112 0.125 0.122 0.114 0.135 0.129 
N 1,765 1,765 1,654 1,616 1,765 1,765 
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Table VI. Market Response to Hidden Earnouts 
 
Second step sequential logistic models distinguish between negative premiums that remain negative, with a PAP base price at t = 
5, and those that become positive. (M) is our standard specification, and (N) and (O) use decomposed valuation levels. (P) and (Q) 
add the direct measure of hidden earnouts. (Q) includes abnormal returns. (R) adds run-ups. We account for industry-specific effects 
with dummies for targets’ and bidders’ SIC codes and include year dummies. Standard errors refer to the Huber-White (1980) 
estimator. ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, and ∗∗∗p < 0.001. 
 
 (M) (N) (O) (P) (Q) (R) 
TQ T -0.162*   -0.124 -0.010 -0.088 
TQ B 0.255*   0.166 0.256* 0.271* 
FIRM T  -0.181     
SECTOR T  0.044     
LONG T  -0.209     
FIRM B   -0.494    
SECTOR B   -0.672    
LONG B   0.746    
HE    13.611* 19.504*  
RUNUP      2.325 
CAR B     9.100*  
CAR T     5.766**  
EQ 0.005 0.023 0.023* -0.006 -0.008 -0.009 
NEW EQ50 -2.108 -0.108 0.351    
RSIZE 0.576 -0.113 -0.482 -0.485 -0.229 0.155 
BIG T 1.332 0.667 0.750 -8.127* -10.877*** -6.740** 
EQxBIG T    0.100* 0.132*** 0.089 
MKT BIDS     0.010 0.002 
MKT VOL     -0.337 -0.480** 
NUMBID -2.161 -0.452 0.594 -0.949 1.611 -1.050 
TENDER 0.318 0.755 1.753 -1.026 -0.626 -0.724 
HORIZONTAL 1.341* 0.182 0.934 1.834** 1.754* 1.328* 
WITHDRAWN -0.600 -0.772 -0.378 -0.468 -1.098 -1.028 
HOSTILE -0.470 2.158 1.946 4.521* 7.422** 6.140* 
ll -64.112 -66.508 -65.073 -58.193 -45.344 -56.867 
aic 202.225 207.016 204.147 192.387 174.689 193.734 
bic 309.167 311.366 308.497 301.353 294.801 309.348 
r2 p 0.300 0.211 0.218 0.349 0.488 0.379 
N 133 124 124 130 129 133 
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Table VII. Market Response to Overvaluation 
 
The second step of sequential logistic models distinguishing between negative offer premiums with a negative abnormal return 
(one if CAR T < 0) and a non-negative return (zero if CAR T ≥ 0). Starting with the basic specification (S), (T), and (U) replace 
Tobin’s Q with decomposed valuation levels. (V) adds run-ups, the interaction effect between run-ups and the target’s valuation in 
(W), the direct measure of hidden earnouts in (X), and the bidder’s abnormal market response, as well as proxies for liquidity in 
(Y). We account for industry-specific effects with dummies for targets’ and bidders’ SIC codes and include year dummies. Standard 
errors refer to the Huber-White (1980) estimator. ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, and ∗∗∗p < 0.001. 
 
 (S) (T) (U) (V) (W) (X) (Y) 
TQ T 0.207**   0.190* 0.146* 0.176* 0.151 
TQ B -0.112   -0.161 -0.216 -0.292* -0.337* 
FIRM T  0.619*      
SECTOR T  0.929*      
LONG T  -0.005      
FIRM B   0.062     
SECTOR B   0.470     
LONG B   -0.372     
RUNUP    7.840*** 11.209*** 11.906*** 14.480*** 
RUNUPxTQ T     -1.090** -0.954** -1.271* 
CAR B       -8.084* 
HE      1.924  
EQ 0.002 -0.003 -0.005 -0.003 -0.004 0.000 -0.002 
NEW EQ50 -0.317 -0.340 -1.286 -0.347 -0.307 0.330 -0.504 
RSIZE 0.400 0.708 0.644 0.438 0.406 0.096 0.213 
MKT BIDS       0.024 
MKT VOL       0.007 
NUMBID 2.699* 2.248 1.766 2.124 2.538 2.677 3.060 
TENDER 1.601 -0.814 -0.273 0.514 0.721 0.830 1.053 
HORIZONTAL -0.684 -1.128* -0.056 -0.713 -0.780 -0.827 -0.986 
WITHDRAWN -0.588 -0.127 0.194 -0.351 -0.101 -0.025 -0.017 
ll -74.965 -69.844 -77.620 -64.336 -61.032 -55.104 -52.287 
aic 219.929 211.688 215.240 200.671 196.064 184.209 182.573 
bic 321.872 314.361 301.266 305.527 303.832 289.151 294.106 
r2 p 0.204 0.212 0.137 0.317 0.352 0.368 0.415 
N 136 128 130 136 136 126 129 
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Table VIII. Regional Samples and Determinants of Negative Premiums 
 
The WHOLE SAMPLE includes all merger announcements in SDC from 1995-2011, where public bidders seek to acquire full 
ownership of public targets and excludes regulated target industries (financials, SIC 6..., and utilities, SIC 49..) and deal values that 
are smaller than 10 mil $. AM, EU, and AP denote target regions North America (USA, CAN), Europe, and Asia-Pacific (incl. 
Japan), respectively, as defined in SDC. NEG (% of N) and NEG (median %) report frequencies and medians for negative 
premiums. Self-dealing refers to self-tenders and repurchases and bids where both parties have the same ultimate parent. “Toehold 
YES” dummies bidders with target shares prior to the bid. “Mandatory YES” dummies mandatory offers. “Reverse YES” dummies 
reverse takeover bids. “Other YES” dummies bids that are not first bids, multiple bids on the same day by the same bidder, asset 
swaps, joint ventures, estimated and rumored announcement dates, and bankrupt or liquidated targets. The SUBSAMPLE refers to 
actual negative premiums after accounting for the reasons mentioned above. Note that SUBSAMPLE AM differs from the main 
sample in this paper as the former includes cross border deals and Canadian deals. 
 
Region  All AM AP EU 
WHOLE SAMPLE      
N  6,592 3,912 1,310 1,370 
NEG (% of N)  0.10 0.08 0.11 0.13 
NEG (median %)  -11.04 -10.58 -12.35 -10.47 
NEG % of N median (%) % of N % of N % of N 
Self-dealing NO (N = 5,734) 0.10 -11.57 0.07 0.10 0.12 
Self-dealing YES (N = 858) 0.16 -9.71 0.10 0.19 0.16 
Toehold NO (N = 5,018) 0.09 -11.95 0.08 0.10 0.14 
Toehold YES (N = 1,574) 0.15 -9.85 0.09 0.14 0.12 
Mandatory NO (N = 6,506) 0.10 -11.14 0.08 0.11 0.13 
Mandatory YES (N = 86) 0.15 -2.82  0.22 0.07 
Reverse NO (N = 6,362) 0.10 -10.67 0.07 0.11 0.12 
Reverse YES (N = 230) 0.22 -14.47 0.16 0.23 0.30 
Other NO (N = 5,142) 0.10 -9.71 0.07 0.11 0.12 
Other YES (N = 1,450) 0.12 -15.61 0.09 0.12 0.16 
SUBSAMPLE      
N  3,680 2,792 522 366 
NEG (% of N)  0.08 0.07 0.09 0.10 
NEG (median %)  -10.11 -9.60 -11.57 -9.93 
NEG % of N median (%) % of N % of N % of N 
HORIZONTAL 0 (N = 2,166) 0.07 -11.14 0.06 0.08 0.08 
HORIZONTAL 1 (N = 1,514) 0.09 -9.47 0.08 0.09 0.13 
CROSS BORDER 0 (N = 2,773) 0.09 -9.76 0.07 0.11 0.11 
CROSS BORDER 1 (N = 907) 0.05 -10.93 0.04 0.06 0.07 
NUMBID 0 (N = 3,439) 0.08 -10.14 0.07 0.09 0.10 
NUMBID 1 (N = 241) 0.07 -9.76 0.08 0.04 0.09 
WITHDRAWN 0 (N = 3,149) 0.07 -9.71 0.06 0.08 0.09 
WITHDRAWN 1 (N = 531) 0.11 -10.96 0.09 0.12 0.14 
TENDER 0 (N = 2,395) 0.10 -9.76 0.08 0.17 0.15 
TENDER 1 (N = 1,285) 0.04 -10.63 0.03 0.06 0.05 
HOSTILE 0 (N = 3,552) 0.08 -10.11 0.07 0.09 0.10 
HOSTILE 1 (N = 128) 0.05 -7.70 0.06 0.00 0.06 
63 
STOCK 0 (N = 2,296) 0.05 -9.35 0.05 0.05 0.08 
STOCK 1 (N = 1,384) 0.13 -10.48 0.11 0.16 0.13 
CASH 0 (N = 2,451) 0.10 -10.16 0.09 0.13 0.12 
CASH 1 (N = 1,229) 0.03 -6.99 0.02 0.02 0.05 
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Web Appendix A (Proofs) 
Proof of Lemma 1 
Using results in the proof of Proposition 1 and the definition of hidden earnouts πh = pm − p, we 
obtain the following: 
 
𝜋ℎ = 𝑝𝑚 − 𝑝 
𝜋ℎ𝑣𝑓
𝑇 = 𝑒𝑏
𝐾𝑀
𝐾𝐵
+ (1 − 𝑒)𝑏 − 𝑏 
𝜋ℎ𝑣𝑓
𝑇 = 𝑒𝑏 (
𝐾𝑀
𝐾𝐵
− 1) 
𝜋ℎ =
𝑒𝑏
𝑣𝑓
𝑇 (
𝑣𝑓
𝐵 + 𝑣𝑓
𝑇 + 𝑠 − (1 − 𝑒)𝑏 − 𝑣𝑓
𝐵 − 𝑒𝑏
𝑣𝑓
𝐵 + 𝑒𝑏
) 
𝜋ℎ =
𝑒𝑏
𝑣𝑓
𝑇 (
𝑣𝑓
𝑇 + 𝑠 − 𝑏
𝑣𝑓
𝐵 + 𝑒𝑏
) 
 
Thus, πh = 0 if e = 0 or b = vfT + s so that only the target gains from the acquisition by getting all 
of the synergies (i.e., λ = 1). 
 
Proof of Proposition 1 
Using definition (5) and the post-merger value of the bid (4), the participation constraint demands 
the following inequality. 
 
𝑝𝑚 =
𝑋𝑁𝑇𝐾𝑀 + (1 − 𝑒)𝑏
𝑣𝑓
𝑇 − 1 > 0 
 
Inserting the stock exchange rate X = eb/(KBNT) based on (2) and KM (3) under the assumption e 
> 0, the inequality becomes: 
 
𝑒𝑏
𝐾𝑀
𝐾𝐵
+ (1 − 𝑒)𝑏 > 𝑣𝑓
𝑇 
𝑒𝑏
𝑣𝑓
𝐵 + 𝑣𝑓
𝑇 + 𝑠 − (1 − 𝑒)𝑏
𝑣𝑓
𝐵 + 𝑒𝑏
+ (1 − 𝑒)𝑏 > 𝑣𝑓
𝑇 
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𝑣𝑓
𝐵 + 𝑣𝑓
𝑇 + 𝑠 − (1 − 𝑒)𝑏 + (1 − 𝑒)𝑏 +
1 − 𝑒
𝑒
𝑣𝑓
𝐵 >
𝑣𝑓
𝑇
𝑒𝑏
(𝑣𝑓
𝐵 + 𝑒𝑏) 
𝑣𝑓
𝑇 + 𝑠 +
𝑣𝑓
𝐵
𝑒
>
𝑣𝑓
𝑇𝑣𝑓
𝐵
𝑒𝑏
+ 𝑣𝑓
𝑇 
𝑠 >
𝑣𝑓
𝐵
𝑒
(
𝑣𝑓
𝑇
𝑏
− 1) 
 
Then. from (1) and without mispricing, b/vf
T = p + 1 gives the following: 
 
𝑠
𝑣𝑓
𝐵 >
1
𝑒
(
−𝑝
1 + 𝑝
) 
 
Proof of Proposition 2 
By definition 𝜉 =
𝑋𝑁𝑇
𝑁𝐵+𝑋𝑁𝑇
=
𝑒𝑏
𝑣𝑓
𝐵+𝑒𝑏
; thus, ξ < 0.5 defines an upper bound for b. 
 
𝑒𝑏 < 0.5𝑣𝑓
𝐵 + 0.5𝑒𝑏 ↔ 𝑏 <
𝑣𝑓
𝐵
𝑒
 
 
Thus, as vf
T>b  p<0 (1), the upper bound of b is violated for vfT> vfB/e, resulting in a negative 
premium. 
 
Proof of Proposition 4 
From the participation constraint (pm > 0), assumption A-4, and the results in the proof of 
Proposition 1, we obtain the following inequality: 
 
𝑠 >
𝑣𝑓
𝐵
𝑒
(
𝑣𝑓
𝑇
𝑏
− 1) ↔
𝑒𝑠
𝑣𝑓
𝐵 + 1 >
𝑣𝑓
𝑇
𝑏
 
𝑒𝑠 + 𝑣𝑓
𝐵
𝑣𝑓
𝐵𝑣𝑓
𝑇 >
1
𝑏
↔ 𝑏 >
𝑣𝑓
𝐵𝑣𝑓
𝑇
𝑒𝑠 + 𝑣𝑓
𝐵 
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Using Assumption A-3, a fair bid reflects the target’s fundamental value and the negotiated share 
of synergies b = λs + vfT, which completes the proof. 
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Table W1. Robustness to Different Premium Measures 
 
Reference Model (A) with six alternative premium measures. (R1) refers to our standard base price at t = -20, but excludes slightly 
negative premiums, which may be due to noise, by coding negative premiums (that are) smaller than -5% with a dummy equal to 
one. (R2) refers to our standard base price at t = -20, but without adjusting for changes in the S&P 500 Index. (R3) and (R4) 
compute index-adjusted premiums with a base price at t = −5 and t = -1, respectively. (R5) refers to the average of the index-
adjusted target share prices at t = -20, t = -5, and t = -1. Finally, (R6) applies an index-adjusted base price at t = -40. We account 
for industry-specific effects with dummies for the targets’ and bidders’ SIC codes and include year dummies. Standard errors refer 
to the Huber-White (1980) estimator. ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, and p < 0.001. 
 
 (R1) (R2) (R3) (R4) (R5) (R6) 
TQ T 0.143*** 0.137*** 0.103*** 0.127*** 0.141*** 0.068* 
TQ B -0.116* -0.056 -0.048 -0.061 -0.074 -0.005 
EQ 0.011** 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.008** 0.010** 0.011*** 
NEW EQ50 0.236 0.256 0.296 0.338 0.485 -0.068 
RSIZE 0.815*** 0.793*** 0.648*** 0.542** 0.751*** 0.475* 
MKT BIDS -0.005 -0.006 0.002 0.000 -0.002 0.004 
MKT VOL -0.055 -0.042* -0.061 -0.036 -0.051 -0.046 
NUMBID 0.684 0.219 0.400 0.527 0.000 -0.383 
TENDER -0.318 -0.402 -0.348 -0.432 -0.255 -0.131 
HORIZONTAL 0.075 0.186 0.089 -0.036 -0.064 -0.088 
WITHDRAWN 0.349 0.415 0.094 -0.298 0.038 0.426 
HOSTILE -0.650 -0.101 -0.693 -0.929 -0.624 0.994 
ll -316.084 -403.191 -372.755 -449.331 -355.574 -401.945 
aic 716.168 878.382 829.511 984.662 791.148 887.890 
bic 946.204 1,075.555 1,057.501 1,220.126 1,008.234 1,117.423 
r2 p 0.153 0.159 0.112 0.112 0.130 0.102 
N 1,767 1,767 1,683 1,765 1,681 1,746 
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Table W2. Robustness to Cash Mergers and Multiple Bids 
 
(R7) and (R8) replicate (A) and (B) excluding cash mergers, respectively. (R9) and (R10) replicate Specifications (A) and (B) after 
removing multiple bids. The main findings that the positive impact of a target’s valuation (TQ T), equity portion (EQ), relative size 
(RSIZE), and the hidden earnout measure (HE) and the negative impact of market volume (MKT VOL) are not affected by the 
exclusion of cash mergers or multiple bids. We account for industry-specific effects with dummies for the targets’ and bidders’ 
SIC codes and include year dummies. Standard errors refer to the Huber-White (1980) estimator. ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, and ∗∗∗p < 
0.001. 
 
 (R7) (R8) (R9) (R10) 
TQ T 0.140*** 0.149*** 0.152*** 0.156*** 
TQ B -0.081 -0.101 -0.090* -0.118* 
EQ 0.019* 0.015* 0.010*** 0.018*** 
NEW EQ50 0.350 0.881 0.799 1.545** 
RSIZE 1.005*** 1.579*** 0.689*** 0.716* 
BIG T  0.204  0.385 
HE  21.112***  19.077*** 
MKT BIDS -0.008 0.001 -0.006 0.002 
MKT VOL -0.086 -0.079** -0.073* -0.065** 
NUMBID 0.696 0.252   
TENDER -1.251 -0.733 -0.323 -0.345 
HORIZONTAL 0.247 0.398 0.193 0.293 
WITHDRAWN 0.167 0.217 0.106 0.194 
HOSTILE 0.000 0.000 0.117 0.303 
ll -309.379 -224.212 -398.265 -319.476 
aic 700.758 534.424 864.530 726.953 
bic 904.016 746.895 1,049.495 965.643 
r2 p 0.157 0.368 0.147 0.294 
N 1,051 1,034 1,703 1,677 
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Table W3. Determinants of Negative Premiums with Additional Liquidity Measures 
 
Logistic regressions explain negative premiums. We extend the reference Model (A) in Table IV by including stock market liquidity 
measures (ZERO, SPREAD) in (E1), a dummy for distressed targets based on Altman’s Z-score (Z DISS) in (E2), the Altman’s Z-
score (Z SCORE) in (E3), and the WW index measuring targets’ financial constraints in (E4). We account for industry-specific 
effects with dummies for the targets’ and bidders’ SIC codes and include year dummies. Standard errors refer to the Huber-White 
(1980) estimator. ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, and ∗∗∗p < 0.001. 
 
 (E1) (E2) (E3) (E4) 
TQ T 0.138*** 0.103* 0.088* 0.087* 
TQ B -0.094* -0.088 -0.078 -0.050 
EQ 0.010** 0.008* 0.008* 0.008* 
NEW EQ50 0.678 0.107 0.108 0.179 
RSIZE 0.791** 0.755* 0.771** 1.000*** 
MKT BIDS -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 
MKT VOL -0.118** -0.130** -0.134** -0.143** 
ZERO 0.793    
SPREAD 0.057    
Z DISS  -0.036   
Z SCORE   0.000  
WW    0.001*** 
NUMBID 0.259 0.487 0.493 0.444 
TENDER -0.404 -0.360 -0.351 -0.435 
HORIZONTAL 0.132 0.282 0.271 0.268 
WITHDRAWN 0.222 0.125 0.125 0.121 
HOSTILE -0.930 -1.009 -1.025 -1.010 
ll -317.006 -209.633 -209.046 -226.525 
aic 722.012 491.266 482.093 531.050 
bic 955.233 664.668 636.229 722.296 
r2 p 0.152 0.151 0.154 0.164 
N 1,481 913 913 996 
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Table W4. Determinants of Low Premiums (LPs) Using Logistic Regressions 
 
(E5) is the reference model. (E6) and (E7) decompose valuation levels. (E8) includes the direct measure of hidden earnouts. (E9) 
focuses on targets’ profitability and (E10) on financial health. We account for industry-specific effects with dummies for the targets’ 
and bidders’ SIC codes and include year dummies. Standard errors refer to the Huber-White (1980) estimator. ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, 
and ∗∗∗p < 0.001. 
 
 (E5) (E6) (E7) (E8) (E9) (E10) 
TQ T 0.142***   0.160*** 0.126* 0.105** 
TQ B -0.106**   -0.124** -0.149* -0.071* 
FIRM T  0.186**     
SECTOR T  0.223*     
LONG T  0.561***     
FIRM B   0.037    
SECTOR B   0.173    
LONG B   0.281    
EQ 0.010*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.018*** 0.016*** 0.010** 
NEW EQ50 0.628 0.172 0.166 1.170* 0.578 0.287 
RSIZE 0.755*** 0.863*** 0.802*** 0.375 0.318 0.777*** 
BIG T    1.130*** 1.171*  
HE    19.227*** 23.283***  
ROIC     0.004  
TURNOVER     0.170  
CI     0.078  
MKT BIDS -0.004 -0.006 -0.004 0.002 0.001 -0.002 
MKT VOL -0.055* -0.009 -0.011 -0.049* -0.041 -0.078 
LEVERAGE      -0.283* 
SHORT DEBT      0.381 
CASH TA      1.043 
WC TA      -1.287* 
LIAB      -0.077 
NUMBID 0.160 0.499 0.422 -0.457 -0.548 0.200 
TENDER -0.280 -0.202 -0.205 -0.210 -0.300 -0.132 
HORIZONTAL 0.065 0.062 0.081 0.102 0.400 0.085 
WITHDRAWN 0.280 0.105 0.070 0.310 0.192 0.183 
HOSTILE -0.106 0.338 0.265 0.053 0.301 -0.164 
ll -482.535 -917.433 -902.132 -380.648 -230.693 -272.352 
aic 1,047.070 1,914.866 1,882.265 851.296 523.385 628.704 
bic 1,271.629 2,134.106 2,095.179 1,097.069 678.480 836.437 
r2 p 0.138 0.081 0.073 0.297 0.287 0.143 
N 1,767 1,774 1,736 1,740 1,100 1,039 
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Table W5. Alternative Windows for CARs 
 
The second step of the sequential logistic models distinguishing between negative premiums that remain negative, with a PAP base 
price at t = 5, and those that become positive (1 if PAP < 0; 0 if PAP ≥ 0), which is in line with Table VI. To compare different 
windows for cumulated abnormal returns, the standard model (Q) is reported, which uses a window from t = -1 to t = 1. Alternative 
windows for the bidder’s and target’s cumulated abnormal returns based on [-1,5] in E(11), [-1,20] in E(12) and [-1,60] in E(13) 
are reported. We account for industry-specific effects with dummies for targets’ and bidders’ SIC codes and include year dummies. 
Standard errors refer to the Huber-White (1980) estimator. ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, and ∗∗∗p < 0.001. 
 
 (Q) (E11) (E12) (E13) 
TQ T -0.010 0.079 0.025 0.021 
TQ B 0.256* 0.159 0.184 0.283* 
HE 19.504* 12.683 14.169 13.013 
CAR B 9.100*    
CAR T 5.766**    
CAR B 5d  4.532   
CAR T 5d  6.592*   
CAR B 20d   -0.193  
CAR T 20d   3.232*  
CAR B 60d    -2.827 
CAR T 60d    3.399* 
EQ -0.008 -0.012 -0.014 -0.013 
RSIZE -0.229 -0.366 -0.550 0.242 
BIG T -10.877*** -8.994** -8.853** -11.599** 
EQxBIG T 0.132*** 0.115*** 0.119*** 0.144*** 
MKT BIDS 0.010 0.014 0.006 0.000 
MKT VOL -0.337 -0.361* -0.457* -0.451* 
NUMBID 1.611 1.001 0.057 -0.683 
TENDER -0.626 -1.047 -0.714 -3.739 
HORIZONTAL 1.754* 1.259 1.285 1.181 
WITHDRAWN -1.098 -1.130 -1.167 -1.117 
HOSTILE 7.422** 6.174* 6.765** 10.542*** 
ll -45.344 -45.207 -48.152 -41.343 
aic 174.689 174.413 180.304 164.686 
bic 294.801 294.526 299.760 276.144 
r2 p 0.488 0.489 0.446 0.461 
N 129 129 127 112 
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Table W6. Alternative Proxies for Overvaluation 
 
To compare different measures of overvaluation, the reference Model (A) in Table IV is reported, which uses Tobin’s Q. (E14) 
reports operating accruals (ACCR), while net operating assets (NOA) are shown in Model (E15). Specification (E16) uses the 
price-to-residual income-model-value (PRIMV) with a constant discount rate of 12.5% and a three-year window. We account for 
industry-specific effects with dummies for the targets’ and bidders’ SIC codes and include year dummies. Standard errors refer to 
the Huber-White (1980) estimator. ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, and ∗∗∗p < 0.001. 
 
 (A) (E14) (E15) (E16) 
TQ T 0.144***    
TQ B -0.094*    
ACCR T  0.645   
ACCR B  0.183   
NOA T   0.195  
NOA B   -0.546  
PRIMV T    0.016* 
PRIMV B    0.000 
EQ 0.010*** 0.015** 0.013** 0.015* 
NEW EQ50 0.597 1.023 1.044 0.768 
RSIZE 0.772*** 1.148*** 1.035*** 1.172** 
MKT BIDS -0.004 -0.010 -0.009 -0.010 
MKT VOL -0.070* -0.067* -0.070* -0.060* 
NUMBID 0.511 -0.351 0.271 -0.505 
TENDER -0.426 -0.348 -0.329 -0.983 
HORIZONTAL 0.135 -0.114 -0.152 -0.144 
WITHDRAWN 0.230 0.066 -0.106 0.330 
HOSTILE -0.310    
ll -416.472 -153.493 -173.525 -135.233 
aic 896.944 382.987 405.051 346.467 
bic 1,072.209 551.132 536.782 512.717 
r2 p 0.149 0.245 0.220 0.277 
N 1,767 617 694 587 
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Table W7. Agency Costs and Negative Premiums 
 
To compare different specifications, the reference Model (A) in Table IV is reported. Models (E17) and (E18) include agency 
proxies, which refer to discretionary accruals (DA) and non-discretionary accruals (NDA). The residuals of Regression (7) are 
discretionary accruals, while the fitted values refer to non-discretionary accruals. (E18) also includes the bid-ask spread (SPREAD) 
as a proxy for information asymmetry. (E19)] refers to very low premiums (bottom 25%), while (E20) explains very high premiums 
(top 25%). We account for industry-specific effects with dummies for the targets’ and bidders’ SIC codes and include year 
dummies. Standard errors refer to the Huber-White (1980) estimator. ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, and ∗∗∗p < 0.001. 
 
 (A) (E17) (E18) (E19) (E20) 
TQ T 0.144*** 0.153** 0.136* 0.124** -0.094 
TQ B -0.094* -0.069 -0.028 -0.042 0.036 
DA T  1.198 1.689* 0.117 -0.775* 
DA B  0.708 -0.504 -0.375 1.293 
NDA T  -1.577 -2.406 -2.296 1.878 
NDA B  -1.015 -2.683 0.320 -0.775 
SPREAD   0.049 -0.034 -0.009 
EQ 0.010*** 0.014** 0.011 0.009** 0.002 
NEW EQ50 0.597 0.821 1.316 -0.618 0.918 
RSIZE 0.772*** 1.170*** 1.399* 1.279*** -1.964** 
MKT BIDS -0.004 -0.012 -0.011 -0.009 0.003 
MKT VOL -0.070* -0.074* -0.127** -0.010 0.002 
NUMBID 0.511 -0.632 -0.001 -0.258 -1.107 
TENDER -0.426 -0.306 -0.205 -0.119 0.333 
HORIZONTAL 0.135 -0.183 -0.013 -0.196 0.365 
WITHDRAWN 0.230 0.062 0.033 0.540 -0.563 
HOSTILE -0.310   0.861 0.208 
ll -416.472 -143.476 -116.596 -259.983 -275.690 
aic 898.944 370.952 315.191 613.967 627.380 
bic 1,079.686 554.917 487.246 818.622 792.514 
r2 p 0.149 0.269 0.258 0.147 0.155 
N 1,767 590 491 575 570 
 
